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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRADE CO~IMISSION OF UTAH, 
RTA '11 E O:F1 UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appell ant, 
-\"S.-
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., 
GHAND CENTRAL STORES, 
TNC., d/h/a 'WARSHAW'S 
GTANT FOOD and GRAND 
CE1\'11 RAL DRUGS, INC. 
l'TAH In~T,\JL GROCJ£RS' 
1\SSOClA'l'l(>l\ 
l11ter1'enor-Appellwnt. 
\ Case 
No.11034 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT, 
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC. 
NATURE 01'"' THE CASE 
This is an action ini:ititutcd by the Utah Trade Com-
missio11 to 011join each of the defendant-respondents 
from selling certnin merchandise in violation of the 
1'tali Unfair Practices Act (13-5-7, 13-5-9, Utah Code 
Annotntc(l 1933, as amended). The Utah Retail Gro-
c·Prs' "\ ssocia tion was permitted to intervene in the 
<1dio11. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried to the lower court without a 
jury. Based upon the stipulations of the parties and 
the evidence adduced a,t trial, the court entered judg-
ment in favor of defendants, and held the Unfair Prac-
tices Act to be unconstitutional as being in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and in violation of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah, Article I, Sections 1, 2, 7, 18, 23 and 
24, Article VI, Section 26, and Article XII, Section 20. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent, Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 
seeks affirmance of the judgment of the lower court and 
a declaration by the Supreme Court that the Utah 
Unfair Practices Act is unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are those as set forth by the 
lower court in its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. (hereinafter called 
"Skaggs") and Grand Central Stores, Inc., dba War-
shaw 's Giant Food and Grand Central Drugs, Inc. 
(hereiuafter called "Grand Central") are retail mer-
chants, who offer for sale a wide variety of merchandise, 
each item of which has individual cost factors such as 
variai1ce in consumer demand for the product, rate of 
turnover, cost of aclvertising, harnlling coshi, includiug 
warehousing, marketing, packaging, displaying and pur-
chasing costs, varying depreciation sometimes depend-
ing on perishability or seasonal demand and sometimes 
depending on obs<)lescence, labor, overhead and admin-
istra.tin1 costs and trade and cash discounts some of 
which cannot be determined or are not known at the 
time the goods are priced for sale. Defendants, each 
using separate ::i.ccounting methods, for the purpose of 
determining proper profit and cost guidelines for their 
operations, are each using sound, accepted and practical 
accounting procedures with as much emphasis of detail 
as ft>asible. Neither defendant attempts to accurately 
<1etermine their cost for each item they sell, as to do so 
would be too costly and hence impractical and not f eas-
ihlc. Defendants cannot reasonably be required to es-
tahlish accounting procedures whereby their actual cost 
per item sold could be determined at or prior to the sale 
or offering for sale of such item. (R. 42) 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on June 23, 1966, 
(1efem1ants advertised ''Crest Family Toothpaste'' at 
50¢, which is a sale below cost as defined by the Utah 
Unfair Pradices Act, with the intent and purpose of 
inducing the purchase of other merchandise or unfairly 
diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring 
a competitor. Since the only defense offered by the 
(1dcndants to this charge was the unconstitutionality of 
tli<:' act, these allegations were taken to be true. (R. 37) 
On .Tune 23, 1966, the defendant, Grand Central, 
ad,·ertised and sold "Aqua Net Hair Spray" at 49¢, 
\\·hich was a sale below cost as defined in the act. On the 
3 
same date, Skaggs advertised and sold "Style Hair 
Spray" at 49¢, which was a sale below cost as ddinerl 
by the act. "Aqua Net Hair Spray'' and "Style Hair 
Spray" are competitive and comparable products "·ith 
regard to weight, size, use, price and customer demand. 
The sales by Skaggs and Grand Central were made in 
an endeavor to meet the price of Shoppers' Discount, a 
competitor of defendants, which had advertised and sold 
"Aqua Net Hair Spray" at 49¢ on June Hi, 1966. The 
sale by Shoppers' Discount was also a sale he low cost as 
defined by the act. Neither defendant has any actual 
knowledge that the sale hy Shoppers' Discom1t was a 
sale below cost as defined by the act. ( R. 39) rrhe court 
concluded that the sales by Grand Central and Skaggs 
were made by defendants in an Pndeavor macle in goon 
faith to meet the price of their competitor selling the 
same article, product or eommoclity, and that ch-fond-
ants were entitled to assume that the ad\·ertised price of 
Shoppers' Disconut was a lt'gal pricP in the al1sv11ce of 
actual knowledge of au illegal sale by Shoppers' Di~­
count. (R. 46) 
On June 20, 1966, Skaggs aclYPrtised a carton of 
eigarettes for $2.73 and gave a <'igarette lighter nwa_\·, 
free, v>'ith the purchase of each <'arton, which eigaretk 
lighter cost Skaggs 25¢ each. The sale of the carton of 
cigarettes alone was not a sale below cost as defined h;· 
the act unless the cost of the cigarettes and 1igl1ter 
,,·ere comhinetl, in "·hich cast• the sale would be a sale 
helow cost as defined hy the ad. ( R. :1!)) 'l'he C'Omt co11-
cludecl that the tra 11saetion in q nest ion did not Yiola t e 
the act since the sale of tlw cig-an•tt(•s wa" not a sale lii>-
4 
low cost as defined by the act and the gift of the lighter 
,,·as not prohihitC><l by the act. (R. 46) 
Ou .TUM 16, J 966, Skagg·s advertised m the Provo 
Daily Herald th0 sale of Vimanal Vitamins at 82¢ per 
h mHl rPd tablets, which was a sale he low cost as defined 
l1y the act. Skaggs had no competitor in the Pro,To area 
\\'ith respect to this item. Thr sale was made by Skaggs 
,,·ith the intent of inducing its cnstomers to purchasr 
other rnerrhandisC>, bnt \Yas not do1i0 with the purpose of 
unfairly divertini.;· trade from a compl'titor or other-
"·isc injuring a eompetitor. (R. ;:rn, 40) The court con-
(']rn le'( l tlH• pro hi hi ti on against thr sale below cost was 
llllC'Ollf<titutional whe1·e the only intent of the retailer in 
pricing tht> item helow cost was to induce the customer 
of the retailer to purchase other merchandise from that 
retailer. (H. 44, 45) 
011 .Tnne 23, 1%6, the deft-ndants advertised "Bayer 
Aspiri11 '' nt ;'};)¢ per lmudre<l. The sale of "Bayer Aspi-
ri11'' at ~);)ef: h:· Gn111d Central was not a sale below cost as 
<1cfiiw<1 b:· the act, bnt the sale by Skaggs was a sale be-
low cost as defi110d hv the act, dnc to the different dis-
romits given to the two defendants in connection with 
tlwir purchase of the item. (R. 24, 25, 40) 
Ou .Tune 20, 1906, Skaggs advertised "Polaroid 
8wing·er Came ms'' at $13.49, which was a sale below 
<'ost as defined in the act, and in connec,tion with the 
snl0 limit0d one camera to a customer. Section 13-5-9 
(2) cr0atcs a prpsumption that a sale was made with the 
i u t t'll t of injuring competitors or destroying compe-
5 
tition where a salf' is ma<le below cost as defined in the 
act and there is a limitation on the quantity which ean 
be sold to any one customer. Except for this statutory 
presumption, there was insufficient evidence that Skaggs 
offered the camern for sale with the intent of inducing 
the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly divert-
ing trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a 
competitor. The court concluded that the statutory pre-
sumption of illegal intent unconstitutionally shifted the 
burden of proof to the defendant and arbitrarily assumes 
an illegal intent from unrelated facts. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant, Skaggs, agrees substantially with the 
general statements of appellant and intervenor-appel-
lant, concerning the role of a court in passing on the con 
stitutionality of a statute, fo the effect that a court will, 
if possible, adopt a construction of a statute which will 
uphold its constitutionality. It should also be pointed 
out, however, tha,t a statute is either constitutional or un-
constitutional by reason of its scope, purpose and effect 
and is to be tested by realistic consideration of the sub-
ject which it encompasses, the purpose which it seeks to 
serve and the effect it has when put into operation. Ac-
cordingly, a court will not amend a statute by con-
struction i1~ order to make it constitutional. Scales Y. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. FJd. 2d 782, SJ S. Ct. 
1469; State ex rel Edwards v. Osbourne, 195 S. C. 295, 
11 S.E. 2d 260 (1940). 
It should also h<-' pointecl out that the statute in ques-
tion here is a criminal statute which may subject a party 
co11\'ictecl of its violation to both a fine and imprisonment. 
Tlw courts will carefully scrutinize any such statute when 
attacked on the grounds that the statute is vague and 
ambiguous or where it fringes upon a basic constitutional 
ri,\d1t. As stated by Justice Crockett in the case of State 
\'.Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952), even where 
a statute is enacted for a proper purpose "great caution 
must lw ohserved i11 permitting encroachments upon basic 
rights, assured by the constitution, and such restrictions 
can he effectecl 011ly in accordance with constitutional 
prerogatin's a11d where clearly expressed standards are 
set up .... where ::i rule is set up, the violation of which 
suhjects one to criminal punishment, the restrictions 
upon eornhwt should he described with sufficient certainty, 
Ro that persons with ordinary intelligence, desiring to 
obey the la,v, may know how to govern themselves in 
c011formit~· with it, and that no one should be compelled 
at the p0ril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as 
to the meaning of penal statutes." (See also City of Price 
, .. Jaynes, lB Utah 89, 191P.2d606 (1948); State v.11!11s-
ser, 118 Ftah 337, 22:3 P.2d 193 (1950); U.8. v. L. Kohen 
Orocery Co., 235 lT.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed. 516. 
Numerous cases from other jurisdictions, both sus-
taining nucl deelaring unconstitutional the Unfair Prac-
tices Ads of other states are annotated in 118 A.L.R. 
:>OG and 128 A.L.R. 1126. No hard, fast rules can be de-
ifretl from the conflicting d0cisions of other courts con-
cerning tlH' constitutionalit>' of this type of statute. Much 
(1f the conflict is due to the fact that the statutes them-
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selws vary widely in regard to what is prohibited, the 
presumptions created, the uniformity of the applicatio 11 
of the statutes in question, etc. An examination of the 
cases can, however,, illustrate why some courts han' 
struck down the Unfair Practices Acts of their own state8 
and provisions which Unfair Practices Acts mm;t or 
must not contain in order to avoid vulnerability to co11-
stitutional attack. The Utah Legislature can he credited 
with incorporating into the Utah Act most of the proYi-
sions which have caused courts of other jurisdictions to 
declare the acts of their states uncoustitutional. 
POINT I. 
THE ACT rs UNCONsrrrTUTIONAL AS BEING 
AN ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE 
IGXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER 
Since the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Ncbbia v. Neu.· York, 291 U.S. 302, :J.J: 
S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934) it has gemTally beeu 
held that Unfair Practices Acts are within the domaiu 
of the state's police power and can be enacted by state 
legislatures. Such acts, however, nn' uucoustitntional if 
''arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelenrnt 
to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and henl'e 
an unnecessary and unwarrauted interference with in-
dividual l~berty.'' The Supreme Court in the N ebbia 
case held that the right of state legislatures to enact such 
legislation is conditioned by the clue process clause and 
that the Fourteeuth .A mernlment reqnirl's "that the end 
shall be accomplished hy methods consistent with dnr 
process.'' The guarantee of due process demands ''that 
8 
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious 
an<l. that the mean selected shall have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object sought to be obtained." 
The Utah Act runs afoul of this basic requirement. 
Utah's Unfair Practices Act as it existed prior to 
1965, provided in part: 
13-5-7. Sales, less than cost. - (a) It is here-
by declared that any advertising, offer to sell or 
sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or 
wholesalers, a,t less than cost as defined in this 
act with the intent and purpose of inducing the 
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly di-
verting trade from a competitor or otherwise in-
j nriug a competitor, impairs and prevents fair 
competition, injures public welfare, is unfair 
('ompetition contrary to public policy and the pol-
ic:· of this act and is declared to be a violation of 
this act, where the result of such advertising, 
off er or sale is to tend to deceive any purchaser 
or prosperti,,e purchaser, or to substantially les-
~en competition, or to unreasonably restrain trade, 
or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce.'' 
In 1965, the statute was amended so as to delete 
the clause, "where the result of such advertising, offer, 
or sale is to tend to deceive any purchaser or prospective 
purchaser, or to substantially lessen competition, or to 
unreasonably restrain trade, or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce.'' As the statute now 
reads, it is a violation of the act to make a sale below cost 
ns clefinc>d hy the act regardless of whether or not any 
pu hlic injury results if the sale is made with the intent 
"of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of 
9 
unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise 
injuring a competitor." 
Most courts which have considered the question have 
held that in order for the statute to be constitutional it 
must only prohibit sales below cost which are made with 
an evil intent, or \vhich accomplish an evil result. E. g. 
Kansas ''· Fleming Co., 184 Kansas 674, 339 P.2d 12 
(1959); Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P.2d 538 
( 1949). As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in the 
case of Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 
P.2d 343 (1950): 
Our study of the decided cases leads to the con-
clusion that a statute attempting to prohibit all 
sales below cost would be unconstitutional, and 
to avoid this result only such sales may be pro-
hibited which are intended to injure the public 
in a manner warranting the exercise of the police 
power. 
The Utah Act as it presently exists can subject a 
defendant to criminal punishment for making a sale with 
the sole purpose of inducing a customer to purchase othrr 
merchandise, a1thcugh such act neither misleads a pur-
ehaser, injures a competitor, tends to create a monop-
oly, restrains trade or lessens competition, and although 
the seller intended none of these results. There is no re-
quirement i!1 the Utah Statute for the existence of an 
intent to injure the public in :my manner and no such 
result need he accomplished in order to make the seller 
guilty. At least this is the contention of appellant in 
charging the defendant Skaggs i11 Count V of the com-
plaint with a Yiolation for 1'elli11g a brand of ,·itamins 
10 
below cost where it was stipulated that no competitor of 
Skaggs had such vitamins available for sale. Skaggs ad-
mits that it priced the vitamins below invoice cost plus 
the statutory 6% markup in hopes that purchasers might 
lm:v other merchandise in addition to vitamins when they 
eame into the store. The court below properly held such 
a prohibition to be unconstitutional. Such a prohibition 
against something which is not in itself evil, does not 
tend tmrnrd something evil and which is not done with an 
evil purpose is beyond the authority of the Legislature 
and is unconstitutional. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court in 
striking down the Unfair Practices Act of that state for 
the statute's failure to provide an illegal intent stated 
in Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67, 70; 
(1940) : 
Price cutting in itself is not an evil; on the 
contrary, the more intense the competition, the 
greater the likely advantage to the purchasing 
public. Indeed there is no reason why a merchant 
should not make an absolute gift of merchandise 
to his customers if he desires to be benevolent or 
therebv advertise his business. There are many 
other · coneeiva ble and wholly proper reasons 
whieh might induce him to make sales without 
profit, as, for example, a necessity of paying im-
portunate ereditors. It is only when the object 
of price cutting is sinister - to destroy a com-
jetitor by suffering· a temporary loss in order ~o 
gain an ultimate monopoly (Mogle 's Steamship 
Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Company, 23 Q. B. 
598), or to defraud the public by seducing ~hem 
into the purchase of other goods at an exorbitant 
price - that the selling of ?oods at ~ess t~an cost 
may constitute an econonnc or social evil. The 
Pe1~nsylvania Act, therefore, is arbitrary, and the 
11 
means which it employs are grossly out of pro-
portion to the object which it seeks to attain. 
In order for a statute to constitutionally restrict a 
person's right to advertise and sell his goods, a danger 
to the public heaHh, welfare or morals must exist and 
the statute must have a substantial a11d reasonable re-
lationship to the correction or elimination of that danger. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Pride Oil Com-
pany v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2nd 183, 370 P.2d :ri5 
(1962) stated that one of the basic tenets of our system is 
that free and open competition is a wholesome, stimu-
lating force in our economy. The court in striking down 
a statute "'hich restricted service stations in advertisillg 
the price of gasoline, stated : 
The attack upon the statutes is based upon the 
ground that they are an invasion of the right to 
o-wn and enjoy property. We have recognized that 
this includes the right to sell it; and to let others 
know of the desire, to do so and the price. 
The validity of appellant's contention that 
these rights are not absolute is acknowledged. One 
who desires to assert them and have them en-
forced by public authority must do so in an aware-
ness that when in the judgment of the legislature 
it appears to be necessary for the protection of 
some more important interest of the public which 
involves safeguarding its health, morals, safety 
or welfare, even those basic personal rights may 
be limited to the extent necessary to so protect 
the public interest. 
But a pivotal consideration in the problem bl'-
fore us is that in order to justify encroachment on 
these rights, such a <lnng-er to the public mnst 
exist and the statute must he sueh that it will luwc 
some substantial arnl rea,.;onable relationship to 
the elimination or correctio11 of the <'\-ii. 
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The Utah Unfair Practices Act makes it a crime for 
a merchant to sell his merchandise for a sum below that 
which is defined as cost by the act, regardless of whether 
such sale misleads a purchaser, injures a competitor or 
restrains trade and regardless of whether the seller in-
tended any of these results. It is difficult to see how this 
act comes within the purview of constitutionality permis-
sible legislation as laid down hv this court in the Pride 
Oil Company case. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND 
AMBIGUOUS 
An Unfair Practices Act which pro Yid es criminal 
sanctions for its violation must not be vague or ambig-
uous in order to avoid offending the due process clauses 
of both the federal and state constitutions. E.g. State v. 
Tr al green Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650 (1941); 
Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy and To-
bacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 201 (1940); Avella v. Al-
mac's, Inc., (R. I. 1965), 211 A.2d 665; State v. Wender, 
149 v\T. Va., 413, 141S.E.2d 359 (1965). As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Packard, 
Supra: 
The limitations of language are such that 
neither absolute exactitude of expression nor com-
plete preci8ion of meaning are to be expected, and 
such standard cannot he required. On the other 
hand there is no disagreement among the courts 
that where a rule is set up, the violation of which 
subjects one to criminal punishment, the restric-
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tions upon conduct should be described "-ith suf-
ficient certainty, so that persons of ordinary in-
telligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how 
to govern themselYes in conforming with it, and 
that no one should he compelled at the peril of 
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the 
meaning of penal statutes .... 
Concerning the question of uncertainty or 
vagueness of statutes the auhoritY seemed to he 
in accord that the test of statute ~ust meet to be 
valid is: It must be sufficiently definite (a) to in-
form persons of ordinary intelligence, who would 
be law abiding, what their conduct must be to 
conform to its requirements; (h) to advise a de-
fendant accused of violating it just what consti-
tutes the offense with which he is charged; and 
( c) to be susceptible of uniform interpret a ti on and 
application by those charged with responsibility 
of applying and enforcing it. 
See also Co~nnally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926); City of Price v. 
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948); State v . .1!11s-
ser, Supra; Musser v. State, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S. Ct. 397. 
92 L. Ed. 562 (1948). 
The cost below which a retailer may not sell his 
goods is defined by the act in Section 13-5-7 ( h) 3, as 
follows: 
3. When used in this act, the term ''cost to 
the retaileT shall mean the invoice cost of the 
merchandise to the retailer within 30 days prior 
to the date of sale, or the date of offering for sale, 
or the replacement cost of tlw m0rchandise to t'.1L' 
retailer, whichever is lower; ]pss all trade dis-
counts except eustomar~- <lisconnts for cash; to 
which shall be a<lded: (a) frPiglit charges not otlt-
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c>rwise included in the i1ffoice cost or the replace-
ment co8t of the merchandise as herein set forth 
and (h) cart ago to the retail outlet if done or paid 
for by the retailer, which cartage cost in the ab-
sence of proof of a lesser cost, shall be deemed to 
he % ths of 1 % of the cost to the retailer as herein 
defined after adding thereto freight charges but 
before adding thereto cartage and mark-up, and 
a mark-up to coyer a proportionate part of the 
cost of tloing business, which mark-up in the ab-
:-:Pnce of proof of a lesser cost, shall be 6% of the 
cost to the retailer as herein set forth after adding 
thereto freight charges and cartage but before 
adding thereto a mark-up." 
Tlw act ostensibly gi\·es to the merchant the right 
to sell his goods for the i1ffoice price of the goods, less 
all trade discounts except "customary discounts for 
cash" plus freight charges plus "a proportionate part of 
the cost of doing business.'' The act condemned by the 
comt in the case of Bal.zer , .. Caler, 7 4 P.2d 839 (Cal. 
A pp. l!"tH), affirmed 82 P.2d rn, also contained a proYi-
sion pro\·itling that the retailer, in order to amid viola-
tion of the statute, must add to the cost of his goods, "a 
mark-up to cover a proportionate part of the cost of 
doing lmsiness." The problems which a retailer faces 
in ('omplying with this statute was pointed out by the 
court in the Balzer case as follows: 
According to the language of the statute, the 
aggregate of all these rnrious items must be add-
ed to the im·oice or replacement costs of a par-
ticular artiek which the vendor desires to sell to 
determi11e the price helow which he is precluded 
from disposing of the goods. A bare statement 
of the asserted rules demonstrates this absurdity. 
It is not the proportion of the overhead expenses 
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which the value of the article for sale bears to the 
value of the entire stock of goous which is to he 
added to the invoice price of the article, but all 
cost incurred in the conduct of such business are 
to be added thereto. Moreover, the statute fails 
to state what period of time is to be included in 
estimating overhead expenses which are to he 
added to the invoice price of the article to lw sold 
so as to determine the cost for resale thereof. A 
merchant's stock in trade varies from time to 
time. Meats, bakery products and certain classes 
of groceries deteriorate rapidly. Is the mer· 
chant to take stock and hold an accounting every 
time he wishes to display for sale a few leader 
articles below normal price for the purpose of ad-
vertisement V For the purpose of such sales is 
he to estimate his average overhead expense for 
the period of the year, or for a month, or is he to 
ascertain that sum on the very day on which hr 
proposes to sell the forbidden article? By what 
standards is a merchant to determine such ele-
ments as depreciation of the goods, selling cost, or 
credit losses? What is to be the measure of the 
value of his equipment? Is there to he no limit of 
expenditures for interest, insurance, or achertis-
ing? The statute throws no light upon thesr per-
plexing problems. EvNy merchant is left to gt1t·s~ 
the rules and standards to he appliccl and to dr-
termine for himself the period for which the 
overhead expenses are to he cakulated. The sec-
tion is therefore uncertain and inrnlicl in that 
regard. 
In this case, Skaggs was found by the court to have 
sold "Bayer Aspirin" at a price in excess of the invoice 
cost of the aspirin but he low "cost" as clefined hy tl1P 
:.1ct. In order to uvoicl violating the law, Skaggs \rnnl<l 
be required to add to each bottle of aspirin sold a propor-
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tionate cost of doing business. How would the cost of 
rental, depreciation, real estate taxes, be applied to the 
sales price of a bottle of ''Bayer Aspirin''? Should the 
bottle of apsirin be required to bear its proportionate 
sl1are of these costs based upon the percentage of space 
\Yhich the bottle occupies in the store~ Should this re-
sulting figure then be modified so as to take into account 
the length of time the boHle occupied that space as com-
parecl with the average length of time which other items 
in the store occupied space? What about the cost of fire 
insurance premiums? Is the bottle of "Bayer Aspirin" 
to bear the same proportionate cost of these premiums as 
are more flammable materials? What proportion of the 
salaries of the employees of the store are to be attributed 
to the bottle of "Bayer Aspirin"? Would it be based 
npon the amount of time it takes a checker to sell a bottle 
of aspirin to a customer? If so, how is the average length 
of time it takes a checker to sell a bottle of "Bayer As-
pirin" to be determined? All of the above questions must 
be answered by the retailer before he can attribute to a 
particular item its proportionate part of the cost of doing 
business. It is questionable that this statute "informs 
persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abid-
iHg, what their conduct must be to conform to its require-
ments." A retailer's only alternative is to add to the 
invoice cost of the goods a 6% ma,rk-up. Such an alter-
native was given to the defendant in the case of State v. 
lV ender, Supra. The statute in this case referred to "oost 
of doing business,'' and the court in holding the act to 
lw unconstitutional found this phrase incomprehensible. 
Since the retailer could not comply with it, he was re-
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quired to rely on the regulati011s imposed by the statute. 
This was held to be no alternative. 
In actual practice the modern retailer may not know 
what the actual price of his goods are to which he is 
required to add the 6%, until long after the sale of that 
item has taken place. 'l'he testimony of ~fr. Edwin N. 
Austin, Jr., in this case concerning this matter is as 
follows: 
Q. There are however other discounts that are 
unknown at the time the goods are received in the 
store, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you describe some of these discounts 
that you are familiar with? 
A. vVell, you have some products that you buy 
over a period of time, you receive free goods, de-
pending upon the quantity as you buy. These are 
in items and categories that you have 110 k11owl-
edge of what those free goods would he. ·when you 
receive them it is almost like a gift. You don't 
know how much you have earned, or how much 
you have coming until they rome around in the 
quota, and send you these free gifts. I am talki11~ 
about like items or appliances at the end of a 
quota or any gi\'en period, they will send yon 
some free goods to rebate you for, perhaps on•r 
this period. There arc other items you get a re-
bate on ·volume, depending upon "'hat your \'Ol-
ume is, and this rebate increases as your volume 
goes up, and it could vary, as au example fro.rn 
5% to 101/c, depeuding on where the level will 
he when vou fo1ish the i-;c>n.so11. [am talking a.bout 
an item iike garden hose. You have> 110 idea how 
much garden host.' you arc> going to sell in a gin-11 
season, but as you rc>ach these differc>nt l<-'\'els you 
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get ~ifferent rebates and you have no way of 
knowmg what these ·will be. So we never enter 
these on our cost ·when we ar<:> cost marking our 
merchandise. (R. 90-91) 
The definition of the price below ·which a seller may 
not sell his merchandise without violating the acit is fur-
th<:>r complicated by the fact that the merchant is to de-
duct from his invoice cost ''all trade discounts except 
eusfoma ry discounts for cash." Now here in the act is 
there a definition as to what is meant by "cmitomary dis-
counts for cash.'' It evidently does not apply to all cash 
diseounts since only "customary cash discounts" are to 
be subtracted frow the trade discounts which reduce the 
im'entor~' price. Customary to whom? A cash discount 
\\'hich is customarily given to this particular merchant, 
or a discount which is customarily ginn in the trade, 
whether or not this particular merchant ordinarily re-
ceives such a discount? The merchant must interpret the 
statute for himself and arrive at its meaning at his peril. 
The clefini ti on of cost as contained in the Unfair Prac-
tic0s Ae,t is too vague and ambiguous to apprise a party 
as to what he may or may not do without violating the 
art. 
The ambiguity in the clefini ti on of "cost" is only 
one of the ambiguities which permeates the act. The act 
prohihi,ts certain sales done "with the intent and pur-
pose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise, or 
of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or other-
1l'ise injuring a conipctitor." The act nowhere indicates 
what is meant by "unfairly diverting trade from a com-
pc>titor. '' If a merchant adnrtises goods below cost in 
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order to reduce his inventory as was done in connection 
with the charge set forth in Counts VII and VIII of the 
complaint, is this unfairly diverting trade from a com-
petitod If he sells an item below cost in order to intro-
duce people to a new store, as was done in connection with 
the charge set forth in Count VI of the complaint, is this 
unfairly diverting trade from a competitor? The merchant 
must guess as to when he is "unfairly" as distinguished 
from fairly diverting trade from a competitor. His guess-
es are at his peril since there are no guidelines whatso-
ever in the statute as to what might constitute an unfair 
diversion of trade from a competitor. If he fairly di-
verts trade from a competitor but that competitor is 
thereby injured by the loss of business, has he "other-
wise injured a competitor" so as to be in violation of the 
acO In Musser v. State, supra, the phrase, "to commit 
any act injurious ... to public morals'' was held to be 
unconstitutional for vagueness. In State v. Packard, 
supra, this court held the term "nationally recognized 
union'' was held too vague and indefinite to meet consti-
tutional standards. If the above terms are too vague and 
indefinite it is difficult to Ree how phrases like "unfairly 
diverting trade frcm a competitor" or "otherwise injur-
ing a competitor'' can stand the constitutional test of in-
forming a party what he may or may not do. 
The act is al130 vague and ambiguous insofar as Sec-
tion 13-5-12 ( d) of the act is concerned. This section 
exempts from the prohibitions of the act sales made: 
( d) In an endeavor madr in gool1 faith to 
meet the legal prices of a eom1wtitor as herein 
defined selling the same article, product, or com-
modity in the same locality or tralle area. 
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To begin with the "legal prices of a competitor" are 
nowhere defined in the act. But assuming that such defi-
nition were given, this provision would still be too am-
biguous to apprise the Reller of what he could or what 
h& could iwt do. An identical provision of the New Jer-
sey Unfair Practices Act was struck down in the case 
of State v. Packard-Bamberger & Company, 123 N.J. 180, 
8 A.2d 291 ( 1939). The court stated: 
How a person is to determine the legality of 
the price of a competitor is not declared, and the 
impracticality, if not impossibility, of determin-
ing the "legality" of a competitor's price is 
obvious. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in striking down 
the Pennsylvania Unfair Practices Act on the grounds 
that it was so vague, indefinite and incapable of practi-
cal application as to make its enforcement a violation of 
due process stated in the case of Commonwealth v. 
Zasloff, supra, "how could a merchant know whether a 
selling price which he proposed to fix was legal because 
it met the 'legal price of a competitor for merchandise of 
the same grade, quantity and quality?' How could such 
a legal price of a competitor be ascertained without ex-
amining the competitor's books in order to determine 
whether his price was legal 1'' 
Furthermore, the exemption applies only to sales 
to meet a competitor "in the same locality or trade 
area.'' Is a small grocery store on the avenues in the 
same "locality or trade area" as a large grocery on 39th 
South~ Is Skaggs' store in Bountiful "in the same lo-
eality or trade area" as Grand Central's store on 9th 
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South in Salt Lake City? In the case of State v. Sta11darrl 
Oil Co. of New Jersey, 195 So. Car. 267, 10 S.E.2d 778 
(1940) the court condemned tlw use of the words "locali-
ty", "community'', "section", "section of a locality" as 
used in a statute prohibiting locality price discrimination. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN ITS UNJUSTIFIABLE 
DISCRIMINATION BETvVEEN PARTIES 
SIMILARLY SITUAT:BJD 
A statute which differe11tiates between different 
classes without a reasonable basis for the differentiation, 
or which has the effect of gi,·ing different treatment to 
persons similarly situated is uncoustitutional. As stat-
ed by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State Y. 
Packard, supra: 
Statutes may deal different classes differently, 
if all within the same class are treated uniformly, 
and so 101w as there is some reasonable basis for 
"' differentiation between classes related to the pur-
pose of the statute. State Y. }[ason, 94 Utah 501, 
78 P. 2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330; State Y. J. V. & R. E. 
\Va1ker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2cl 766. Con-
versely, a statute is unconstitutional as being un-
reasonably discriminatory if it differentiates be-
tween sudh classes witho~1t am· reasonable basis 
bearing on the purpose sought to be accomplished 
by the statute. Gronlund Y. Salt Lake City, 113 
Utah 284, l 94 P.2d 464; Slater Y. Salt Lake Cit~·, 
115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712. 
A unmber of cases haYe helr1 1rnfair Practices Acts 
unconstitutional because of exl'mptions grautecl to cer-
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iain persons under the act and because of discrimination 
between persons similarly situated. E.g. Kansas v. Con-
sumers Warehouse Market, Inc., 185 Kansas 363, 343 
P.2d 234 (1959); Wayne's Distributors, Inc., v. Tilton, 7 
N. J. 349, 81 A.2u 786 ( 1951) ; Serr er v. Cigarette Service 
Co., 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947). Such dis-
criminations in regard to persons exempted from the act 
''1.olate the equal protection and due process clauses of 
hoth the federal and state constitutions. An act is un-
constitutional if it exempts from its provisions classes 
of persons similarly situated to those not exempted in 
regard to the purposes of the act. Gronlund v. Salt Lake 
City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948); Broadbent v. 
Oibson, 105 Utah 55, 140 P.2d 939 (1943). 
The Utah Unfair Practices Act creates just such dis-
crimination. The ordinary retailer is prohibited from 
srlling below cost except where he endeavors "to meet 
the legal price of a competitor.'' A manufacturer or 
producer, on the oilier hand, selling exactly the same item 
is not so confined. His sales below cost are exempted 
under Section l:i-;)-12 ( e) simply by meeting "prices es-
tablished in interstate competition regardless of cost." 
~neh a manufacturer or producer is not limited to meet-
ing "the legal price of a competitor." Thus, a large 
manufacturing and retailing organization can sell its 
goods iu Utah by simply meding the lo"' prices estab-
lished in some other state even though that low price is 
an ''illegal price.'' The small merchant who is not a 
prnducer or mannfacturer ca11110t eYen legally sell at a 
lo\\' price to meet his competitor's prices unless that 
prier is "legal." -While the lcgislatin~ body has a wide 
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discretion in classifying the types of persons or activities 
which come within the purview of a statute, such classi-
fication is unconstitutional when the basis upon which it 
is fom1ded is unreasonable. rrhere must be a reasonable 
basis for the differentiation between the class which is 
made subject to the regulation and the class which is not 
subject to it, which basis must hear a reasonable rela-
tion to the purposes to be accomplished by the act. Slater 
v. Salt Lake Cdy, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 (1949): 
TY allberg v. Utah P'ublic TV cl fare Commission, 115 Utah 
242, 20~ P.2d 935 (1949). 
The different exemptions granted to a manufacturer 
or producer on the one hand and th0 ordinary small re-
tail merchant on the other hand is not only unreasonable 
in view of th0 purpose of the act, hut it frustrates the 
avowed purpose of the act to promote competition. Sec-
tion 13-5-17 of the Utah Unfair Practices Act provides 
as follows: 
The legislature declared that the purpose of 
this act is to safeguard the public against the 
creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to fos-
ter and encourage competition, by prohibiting un-
fair and discriminatory practices by which fair 
and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. 
This act shall be liberally construed that its bene-
ficial purposes may be subserved. 
The broad exemption giv0n to th0 manufacturer-re-
tailer by the act, which is denied to th0 ordinary retail 
merchant, gives the competitiYe advantage to the larg(• 
manufacturer-ret~ilN in violation of the a,·owed pur-
pose of the act. 
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rrhe act also discriminates, without reason or justi-
fication, between retailers who receive cash discounts on 
the purehase of mcrehandise and those who receive trade 
diseounts. In determining the minimum price at which 
a refailer may sell his goods the statute permits a retailer 
who receives a trade discount to deduct the trade dis-
count from the invoice price. The retailer who receives 
a customary cash discount may not deduct this discount 
from his invoice price and will thus be required to sell 
his goods at a higher price than his competitor who re-
cein•s a trade discount, to avoid violating the law. This 
is in spite of the fact that the net costs of the items to 
the retailers is identical. What possible reason there can 
he for this distinction is unfathomable. As stated by 
tlw Utah Supreme Court in Slater v. Salt Lake City, 
supra, "If there is a reason for such classification it is 
ohscure and appears to us to be more fanciful than real." 
rrlie act in treating retailers differently without reason is 
unconstitutional mid cannot be upheld. As this court held 
in Slater "· Salt Lake City, supra, "If we are unable to 
fincl auy reasonable basis for the classification, then we 
cm mot sustain the enactment.'' 
In actual application the act does not treat equally 
persons similarly situated. The act purports to pro-
hibit sales helow cost. The statute purportedly permits 
a i·etailer to take his invoice price for the goods, deduct 
from that price "all trade discounts, except customary 
<liscounts for cash," and add to this sum the cost of 
freight and cartage plus ''a mark-up to cover a pro-
portionate part of the cost of doing business, which mark-
up, in the absence of proof of a lesser cost shall be 6% 
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of the cost to the retailer." The resulting figure is tlw 
figure below which the retailer may not sell his mer-
chandise. As pointed out in POINT II, above, the re-
tailer cannot possibly add to the iuYoice cost ''a propor-
tionate part of the cos,t of doing business.'' Such a pro-
portionate part is impossible to ascertain. He is thus 
forced to add 6% of the cost as a mark-up. This is pre-
sumed to be his cost of doing business and the price be-
low which he is prevented from selling his merchandise. 
This formula unjustly discriminates between mer-
chants carrying 011 different types of operations. As an 
example, the retailer who operates on a <'ash and carry 
basis has less operating expense than the retailer who 
operates on a credit and deliYer~· hasis simply because 
the former has no collection or d<:'linry expense. Yet if 
both merchants purchase their goods from the saml' 
source and thereby haYe the same im,oice cost and rP-
ceive the same discounts, the former is unjustly discrimi-
nated against insofar as the price at \Yhieh he must sell 
is concerned. The cash am] carry merchant is prohibited 
from selling his merchandise for less than the eredit and 
deliYery merchant, even though his cost of doing busi-
ness is less. \Vbile the purported purpose of the statute 
is to prevent retailers from selling below cost, in nctual 
practice the statute operates to set the price of both 
merchants regardless of the merchant's actual cost of 
doing business to .the detriment of the merchant ha\~ng 
the lower operating costs. Such discrimination was con-
demned in the case of Serrcr \'. Ci,qarette Serricc Co., 
supra. The court stated that although 1Pgis1ative bodies 
may, in the exercise of the police power prohibit sales at 
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ue1ow cost, legislation enacted to accomplish this object 
must be so phrased as to recognize economies a.nd prac-
tices whereby one seller can sell particular merchandise 
at a lower price than a competitor and still not be 
<'harge<l "·ith selling belo>Y actual cost. 
The Utah Unfair Practices Act, in giving extensin) 
exemption to manufacturer-retailers, which are not avail-
o.hle to the ordinary retailer, in discriminating without 
reason between the retailer who receives a trade dis-
count and one who receives a cash discount, and in fail-
ing to provide for equal treatment of retailers having 
differing overhead operations, is violative of the due 
process and equal protection pro,'isions of the federal 
and Utah c01rntitutio1rn. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT rs 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE TO PRESUMPTIONS 
WHICH SHIFT 'fHE BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
THE DEFENDANT AND-'WHICH UNREASONABLY 
ASSUME PROHIBITED ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIME TO EXIST FROM FACTS HAVING 
NO REASONABLE RELATION THERETO 
-While it is generally recognized that the legislature 
has the authority to create presumptions from proven 
facts, such authority is limited by the due process clauses 
of both state and federal constitutions. The due process 
clause requires that in a criminal statute the presump-
tion cannot be conclusive, and the fact presumed must be 
fairly inferred from the fart prond. Adler v. Board of 
Erl11catio11, 342 U.S. 483, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 517 
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(1952); Great Atlaidic a11d Pacific Tea Co. v. En:iu, 23 
F. Supp. 70 (D. l\Iinn. 1938). 
The Utah Unfair Practices Act is replete "·ith illegal 
presumptions whict do not meet these basic constitu-
tional requirements. Perhaps the most unconstitutional 
cf such presumptions is the provision of 13-5-7 which 
states that the "cost to the retail('r" shall mean the in-
voice or replacement cost within 30 days of the dak of 
sale, less trade discounts, plus a 6% mark-up to repre-
sent the "proportionate part of the cost of doing busi-
ness." The 6% mark-up is an arbitrary mark-up which 
is stated to be the presumed cost of doing business of 
every seller, ''in the abs enc(' of proof of a lesser cost.'' 
A statutory presumption in a criminal statute in order 
to be constitutional cannot be a conclusive presumption. 
Adler v. Board of Educafio11, supra. A conclusive pre-
sumption of the Colorado Uufair Practices Act was 
struck down by the Colorado Supreme Court in Perkius 
v. King 8001Jers, hie., supra, in which the l'Ourt stated: 
The legislative right to declare that the proof 
of one fact shall be presumptive or prima facie 
evidence of another is no longer open to serious 
dispute in this jurisdictiou, or elsewhere. [Citing 
cases] It may also he said in the light of the fore-
going authorities that the power vestetl in the leg-
islature to create such presumptions is subject to 
the qualifif'ation that there must be some ration-
al connection or reasonahle rP la ti on between the 
fact 1n·oye<l and the ultimate fact to be estab-
lished; also such polt'cr is s11b:iect to the further 
limitation that f/1e JJrPs11111pfio11 cannot be made a 
concl usfre rme. 
(emphasis is that of th0 Colorado 8uprcrnc Court.) 
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·while the language of the Utah Act indicates that 
tlH' presumption of the 6% mark-up is not conclusive, 
the presumption is in fact conclusive and any language 
in the act to the coutrary is illusory. As pointed out in 
POINT II, above, it is impossible for a retailer selling 
lrnndn~ds of items of merchandise to allocate to any par-
ticular item a proportionate part of his cost of doing 
business. The testimony of Dean Randall of the Uni-
\'ersity of Utah College of Business demonstrates this 
impossibility. He pointed out that you can start with 
inrnic0 cost lmt must take into consideration trade 
<1iscounts or cash discouuts and problems of allocating 
these to a particular i·tem available for sale. There are 
frc,iµ;ht costs which must likewise he allocated unless the 
;-;hipment consists of only one product and the problem 
of whether the allocation should he made on the basis 
of 1wight or on some other basis. There are also pur-
<'hasing costs to take into account, such as writing the 
on1Prs, checking the orders and mailing and the time re-
quircLl of the person making the order. In regard to 
tl1e latter, this hccomes n1y difficult ·where the order 
elcrk is purchasing thousands of items and in irregular 
rnlumc•. Storage must be allocated on an arhitrary basis 
and ont> of the factors to he considered is the time the 
particular article is stored and the space i11Yolnd for 
stornge. Transportation from the warehouse or storage 
<Ut•a is a11 ml<litional cost factor. Ad1,ertising costs can 
oeeasiomtlly he allocated if, for example, nothing but 
Bay('l' Aspirin was ach'crtisecl on a certain day for sale 
i11 n particular store, hut where many products are sold 
;1]](] a large shopping area is iiffolncl the allocation of 
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cost of advertising to a particnla r item is "t=>xtrem<'rly 
difficult.'' Dean Randall further testified that under 
both the Skaggs and Grand Central accounting systems, 
both of which he thought were proper accounting systems 
enn though different, it would not be proper to allo-
cate an accurate cost to a specific item. Finally Dean 
Randall concluded as follows : 
In my opinion in a. retail store handling thou-
sands of items it would he economically . impos-
sible to arrive at a realistic cost of s<'lling each 
item. (R 116) 
Since it is impossible for m1~v retailer to prove hil' 
''proportionate part of the cost of doing business'' at-
tributable to an item of merchandisf', the arbitrary prr-
sumption that it is 6% of cost becomes a conclusive pre-
sumptio11. The creation of this conclusive presumption 
is unconstitutional. 
This conclusive presumption with regard to cost, i~ 
fortified by an administrative presumption with regard 
to the intent factor. The <:'xecuti,·e secretary of the Trade 
Commission testified (H. 124) that the statutory requin'-
ment of intent to i11jure a competitor, etc., is taken for 
granted when he firnls a sa]e belO\\' the "legal price." rrhe 
result would be e11forceme11t action aud the burden 
thrown on the defrrnlnnt to prow that he did not intend 
to mJure a compditor ancl so forth. 
The Utah Act nlso creates a presumption in 
13-:'5-9(2) that proof of th!' limitation of the quantity to 
be sold to any one customer couplc•d with a showing that 
the product was ~:old hclow cost ns <10fi11ed by the act, 
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creates a presumption that the sale was made for the 
purpose of destroying competition or injuring a com-
petitor. Count IV of plaintiff's complaint alleged that 
on or about June 20, 1966, the defendant Skaggs adver-
tisrd Polaroid Swinger Cameras for sale at $13.49, which 
was less than cost as defined by the act and limited the 
purchase of the cameras to one (1) to a customer which 
was less than the entire supply owned or possessed by 
Skaggs. The plaintiff relied upon the presumption con-
tained in 13-5-9 (2) to establish that the purpose of the sale 
\1·as to destroy competition or otherwise injure a com-
petitor. Except for this presumption the trial court 
found that there ·was insufficient evidence to justify a 
finding that Skaggs offered the item for sale for any 
purpose proscribed by the statute. 
Such a presumption of illegal intent in an Unfair 
Practices Act has been struck down in several cases from 
dht.•r jurisdictions. E.g. Motts Super Markets, Inc. v. 
Transinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961); W. M. 
Wiley v. Samson-Ripley Co., 131 Maine 400, 120 A.2d 289 
(1%6)); Perkins v. King 8oopers, Inc., supra. In order 
for any presumption to be constitutional the fact pre-
:':lnme<l must be fairly inferred from the fact proven. Tot 
Y. United ,'-Uates, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 
1319 (1943); Adler v. Board of Education, supra. The 
court in (ireat Atlantic and Pacifi,c Tea Co. v. Ervin, 
s11pra, stated iu holding the presumption provision of an 
Unfair Practices .Act to be unconstitutional: 
It is apparent from this decision of the Su-
preme Court that in cletermiui~g tl:e validity of 
a presumption rreated hy a legislative body, two 
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questions a re to he coll side reel: ( 1) Whether thr 
fact presnmecl may be fairly inferred from the 
fact proven: (2) \Vlwther the presumption creat-
ed will be of aid to the state without subjecting 
th0 accused to nureaso11ahle hardship or oppres-
sion. With respect to tlw pr0sumption cn'ated hr 
the sixth paragraph of section ~1 of part 2, we ha,-~ 
already pointed out that in our opinion the fact 
of guilty intent is not reasonablv to he iJlfcrred 
from th~ fact of sale at less tlia1; 10% ahon~ the 
cost of the goods. No doubt, the presumption of 
g-nilt would be helpful to the state in prosecution 
of alleged violators of the statut0, hut it would he 
as hurtful to the accused as it wonld be helpful 
to the accuser. Intent is somethil1g which is 0asily 
asserted al\Cl hard to dispron~. To cast upon a 
merchant who has sold goo(ls at less than 10/c 
abo,-e th(• rost, the bnrde11 of C'stal)lishing that 
the sale was not made with an intent to injure 
competitors or destroy competition, suhjects him 
to unreason a hie hardship. ·we think the disad-
vantage to him of tlw presnmption of guilt should 
he regarded as ouhH•ighing tlw advantage of thr 
presumption to the state. 
The limitafom on the <)mlllf i1.Y of it0ms which a re-
tailer permits 011e customer to purchase has 110 hearing 
\Vhatsoever upon liis intention in se1liug that particular 
item below cost as definNl in the act. 1\fr. Edwin Austin. 
Supervis0r of Skctggs' stor0s in the Salt Lake area, testi-
fied in this case that tlie reasons wh>' a retailer limits 
the number of items which ma>' be pmcliased by one cus-
tom0r are varictl, Hone of which are the injury of a com-
petitor or the lessening of competition. The nwnl>er of 
items which could Le pnrchas0d Ji~- one customer may ]JL' 
rcistrict0d due to tlw fact that thC' retailer has a limited 
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.'-'npply of that particular item and \\'ishes to supply as 
many of his customers with the item as possible, or the 
1111mber of it<:>ms whieh 0110 eustomer may purehase may 
he restricted to prcYent a raid on the retailer's supply of 
that lrnrticular item hy a eompetitor, or the retailer's 
supply of that particular item may be restricted by the 
supplier. The testimony of 1\Ir. A us tin in this connection 
is a:-; follows (R. 88-90): 
Q. Now, with respect to Count V of the - ex-
ense me, Count VI of the eomplaint, this relates 
to the sale of Polaroid Swinger Cameras at $13.49. 
At the time that was sold it is alleged and admit-
ted that we limited the purchase of cameras to 
one per customrr. Can you tell the Court ·why 
tl1at limitdion was imposed? 
A. \VPll, this was ai1 opening in our new store 
O\'<:>r on Eighth \\Tpst, arnl all openings, wr like to 
gi \·e our eustomers something unusual, well, prob-
ably to gin• thrm some reason to come in and look 
at om new store. The reason that this Polaroid 
Camera \\'ClS limited, Polaroid Cameras at that 
tirn(' "·ere on alloeation. \Ve felt \Ye had enough 
rnmeras in this particular market, thi8 Eighth 
\Y rst Store, proYiding they did not come in and 
try to buy all of them up, hrn or three per bill. 
A11other thing, in Polaroid Cameras we usually 
focl wr are limited. \Ve usually frel \\Te do not give 
the customer :10 days' supply in a camera. No 
om' customrr needs more than one camera, and we 
frlt we were justified in limiting it to one camera 
pt>r family so Wl' could supply all our eustomers 
111 that arc11. 
Q. You used the term, the cameras were in 
allocation. 
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A. When Polaroid comes out with new modr\.-.; 
they will quite often allocat. __ • their supply an!l you 
are limited to so many in one Rtore. All of P~la­
roid 's accounts through tlw country would lw al-
located. \Vhatever you are set up for that store, 
that is all you could buy. You can't buy all vou 
want of tlw Polaroid Cam0ras. · · 
Q. (By ~Ir. \Valdo) Referring hack to the 
Swinger Camera now again, it is one item from 
time to time that in your general merchandising 
you find necessary to limit in quantity, is that 
correct? 
A. Occasionally. 
Q. Now, is it possible when yon ha \'e made u 
particularl~y attractive prie0 on an it0m for C'\'en 
one of your com1wtitors to come in and hny large 
quantities of that item'! 
A. This sometimes happens. 
Q. And so it is fair to sa~v that at least on 
o~casions a reason for limiting quantity is to pro-
tect from this kind of competitiYe raid? 
A. Yes. 
It is clear from the uncontraclicted testimony of 1\Ir. Aus-
tin and from a reasoned examination of the presumption 
that there exists no logical conneetion between the fad 
that the retail0r has· limited the number of item:;; which 
ran be purehased b)· on0 customer arnl tlw fact to he 
presumed therefrom, that tlw retailer has the intent to 
injUl'9 01' destrO)' competition. rJ1lH' presumption i~ 
nnconsti tut iona I. 
The lTtah Act also en•ates wlrnt nppenrs to he an 
irrelrnttnhle pre:;;umption of the guilt of an officer or 
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agent of a corporation being prosecuted under the act 
by proof of "the unlawful intent of the person, firm or 
corporation for whom or for which he acts.'' This pre-
sumption is created by Section 13-5-11 of the act. Such 
a presumption is clearly a violation of the due process 
<·lanses of the state and federal constitutions. An identi-
rnl provision of the Unfair Practices Act was held un-
constitutional in Great Atla,ntic and Pacific Tea Co., v. 
Erci11, supra. The court in that case stated: 
To visit the sins of the guilty upon the inno-
cent, to impute a wrongful intent to those who 
have none, to make guilt depend upon a legisla-
tive fiat, ought not to be tolerated under our sys-
tem of criminal jurisprudence. 
'rl1e irrebuttable presumption as to what a retailer's 
prop01·tionate cost of doing business is and the presump-
tions of illegal intent from the existence of facts not re-
lated thereto make the act violate the due process clauses 
of the federal and state constitutions a.ml render the act 
unconstitutional. 
POINT V. 
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRICE FIXING STATUTE 
SincP, as pointed out aboYe, it is impossible for a 
retailer to add to an item which he sells the proportion-
atC' part of the retailer's cost of doing business, the re-
tailer is n•quired to add to his invoice price a charge of 
(i'1~'. ']~his is the price below ~which he cannot legally sell 
11is g·oocls. His failure to make such a mark-up subjects 
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him to the penalties of the criminal law reg-anlless of 
whether such act by the merchant tends to deceive a pur-
chaser, lessens competition, unreasonablv restrains trade 
or tends to create a monopoly. He is declared to be in 
violation of the act regardless of >Yl1ether or 11ot his in-
tent in selling the goods at below the required mark-up 
was with the inte11t of accomplishiug· any of these ef-
fects. But the most sinister aspect of this price-fixing 
statute is that in many instances the 6o/r mark-up which a 
retailer is required to make is not related to the price at 
which he purchased his merchandise, hut to tlw price at 
which his competitors may, at that time, purchase the 
same items. The ::-;tatute specifically prO"\Tides that if a 
retailer purchases merchandise aml does i10t sell all of 
that merchandise 'Yithin a period of 30 days it is not that 
retailer's invoice cost, but the replacement cost of the 
goods to which the 6% mark-up must be added. Thus, a 
merchant ·who makes an advantageous purchase of goods 
at a low price and who still has some or all of the goods 
on hand 30 days after his purchase cannot sell the good~ 
to his customers at a reasonable mark-up which ·would 
have the effect of both furnishing him with a profit and 
passing pal"t of the savings incurred through his advaH-
tageous purchase on to the consumer. In order to avoicl 
violating t!1e law, he must price his goods for an amount 
whieh will, in effect, not be below the price at which his 
comp2titorn can then purcha::-;e the goods at the higher 
invoice price and then sell them at a 67o mark-up. 
If legislati,,e price fixi11g of this sort en11 be justificcl. 
aud of course, we contend it can never he justified, it is 
certainly not justified in onler to protect the "small'' 
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mer(']wnt from !lie "largt~" merchaut as appellants 
\\·ould han' the <'Ourt believe. In this day of coopera-
ti\·e lniyi11g thrnugh large organizations such as Asso-
eiat('d Urneers, both small and large are able to com-
pete with one another on much the same hasis. Appel-
lant 's O\Vll witness, I\rr. Sorenson, testified they could buy 
as well as any of the chai11 stores (R. 147-148). Compe-
i itio11 is the lifo-1Jloocl of trade and freedom in fixing 
prirt>s is funclam011tal to free competition. 
This same type of statute was held to be unconstitu-
tiowd by the \Vest Virginia Supreme Court in the case 
of State Y. Wender, supra. The statute in question in that 
<·nse n•quirPd tlw dcfemlant to make computations con-
< ernillµ; '' rnst of doing lmsiJ1ess. '' The court found this 
as wl'll as other IJJ'O\·isions to be incomprehensible and, 
siucp the rdailel' could not understand it, he was required 
to rel.Y upon the l'cgulations imposed by the statute. This 
nmo1lll ted to price fixing aml was held by the court to 
I JP m1co11st i tutional. 
'!'he lT tali Supreme Court has always carefully scru-
1 i nizt•d legislation ·which smacks of price fixing and if 
prie~ fixing is found has condemned the statute or activ-
ity n:.; l1ei11g in Yiolatiou of Artirle XII, Section 20 of 
the l'tah ( 'onstitutiou. Thus, in Gammon Y. Federated 
Jfilk l'rod111'el's A:-:sociation, Inc., 11 U. 2cl 421, 360 P.2d 
1018 (1961) the Utah Supr0me Court struck clown as 
lllH·o11stitut.ional price fixing, a contract entered into by 
;i eoop<>rntin' under the Uniform Agrieultural Coopera-
tin' .Ad, which set minimum prices for the sale of milk. 
In (;,.11eral Electric Compa11y v. Thrifty Sales, 5 U.2cl 
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326, 301 P.2d i41 (1956) the Utah Supreme Court de-
clared the Utah Fair Trade Act unconstitutional as a 
price fixing statute. In the course of the opinion, Jus-
tice Crockett made the following observations which 
apply just as strongly to the Unfair Practices Act. 
Regardless of whatever forms or rituals are 
gone through to accomplish the purpose of estab-
lishing retailers prices, or of any conjecture about 
the purpose of the legislation, the indisputable 
fact is that insofar as the non-signing merchant 
and the public are concerned, the act so operates 
that the agreement of the manufacturer and one 
dealer does establish the price at which the manu-
facturer's product must be sold by all retailers 
within the area. Therefore, in its basic essence, it 
must he rrgarded as ''price fixing'' and for that 
reason the act is invalid under Section 20, Article 
XII of our Constitution. 
In Pride Oil Company v. Salt Lake County, 13 U.2d 
183, 370 P .2d 355 ( 1962), this court declared unconstitu-
tional a statute which regulated the posting of gasoline 
prices by service stations. The ostensible purpose of the 
statute was to protect the public by preventing false and 
misleading advertising. The court had no difficulty in 
seeing through the avowed purpose of the statute to its 
real purpose, however, which was the control of gasoline 
prices and th~ elimination of gas wars, and the entire 
statute was declared unconstitutional. 
In Rez:ne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 
P.2d 563 (1948) this court declared the Barbers' Price 
and Hour Act to be unconstitutional. The stated pur-
pose of the act was to protect the public by establishing 
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minimum standards for barber shops. In effect, the act 
established minimum prices. The language of Justice 
Latimcr's concurring opinion at page 575 is apropos in 
this case: 
It is most difficult to believe the intent of this 
act is to protect the health and welfare of the pub-
lic. This has already been protected. \Vhen the 
mask is cast aside, we see the familiar act, which 
is claimed to be altruistic in principle, but is 
nothing more than a legislative permit to increase 
the cost of the service to the public. It substitutes 
the will of the profession for the will of the legis-
lature and stifles individual initiative and energy 
·when it is unnecessary to do so to protect the 
public good. It may increase the income of some 
of the individual shop owners, but this has no rea-
sonable relationship to the public health and 
welfare. 
The appellants contend that the Utah Unfair Prac-
tices Act is not a price-fixing statute since it merely es-
tablishes minimum prices. This argument was laid to 
rest in Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Associa-
tion, Inc., supra. That was all the contract involved in 
that case did. The Utah Supreme Court in declaring 
!he contract unconstitutional held, however, 
Upon the basis of the record presented here it 
appears that the defendant acting under the pro-
visions of the agreement with its members has en-
gag0d in fixing the minimum price for which 
milk \ms sold to distributors and processors, and 
iu doing so its conduct has come within the pro-
hibitions of Article XII, Section 20 of our Con-
stitution. 
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POIXT YI. 
THE GIVIKG A\YA Y OF AX ITE~I OF 
MERCHANDISE IN COXKECTION \VITH A SALE 
IS XOT PROHIBITED BY THE 
lTTAH rxF AIR PRACTICES ~\CT 
The lower court found in connection with Count III 
of plaintiff's complaint that on June 20, 1966, Skaggs ad-
,-ertised cartons of cigarettes for $2.73 and gaYe a ciga-
rette lighter away free with each purchase of a carton, 
which cigarette lighter eost Skaggs 2.3¢ each. The sail· 
of the carton of cigarettes alone was not a sale belo"-
cost &s defined by the act, but the combined articles, ciga-
rettes and lighter, if taken together and considered a sin-
gle snle, was a sale below cost as defined by the act. (R. 
39) The court concluded that the sale by Skaggs of eiga-
rettes and the gift of a cigarette lighter \\·ith a carton of 
cigarettes did not ,-iolate the aet because the sale of the 
cigarettes alone was not a sale below cost as defined by 
the act and the 1'6ft of the c-igarettt• lightc>r \\·as not pro-
hibited by the act. (R. 46) 
Prior to the 1965 amendment of the act the first sen-
tence of Section 13-5-9 of the act rea<l as follows: 
For the purpose of preYenting eYasion of the 
1n·o\isions of this act in all sales im·olYing mo_rr 
than one item or commodity a11d in all salPs lll-
rolri11g tlzP giri119 of any ro11cpssio11 of any h:iud 
1clwtsoerer ( wlietl1l'r it br coupons or othenc1sc) 
the Yendor's or distributor's selling price slrnll 
not be below the cost of all articles, products, com-
modities, a11d co11cessio11s included in such tran~ 
actions. 
-1:0 
ThP emphasized portions of the act which preeluded 
t!Jl' giYiug away uf ih'ms were deleted hy the 1965 legis-
lature, and the act as it no\\' reads does not prohibit give-
;11rnys. In each of the following cases the comis han 
held that Fnfair Practices Acts do not prohibit the giv-
ing- away of items in connection with sales unless the act 
in (1uestio11 specifically prohibits such action. State Ex 
!ns. Heath Y. Ta11ker Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 26 N"."\\.2cl 
1q.7 (1~141): C11ited Retail Orocers Assor·iatin11 "· Har-
rison & Sons, I11c., 89 Pa. D & C 294 (1954); State of 
.lf i1111r.-:ota Y. ~1ppleba11ms Food Jlarket, Inc., 259 :\Iinn. 
~fl'.l, JO(; X."\Y. 2d 896 (1960). 
COXCLT'SIOX 
The lTtah rnfair Practices ~'1et lS an arbitrar>· and 
mll'easona hle exercise of the police power, which is so 
tm(·on~;titntionally Yagne that those subject to its proYi-
:-;i(111:-; ('amwt determine \Yhat the:-- may or may not do in 
1mler to ffrnid committing a crime. It is an act which 
nn.iustifia bl:-- discrimi1iates lwtween persons similarly sit-
natt>d and im1n·o1wrl:- creates presumptions of g-uilt 
<llHl is, in <>ffect, Eotl1ing more than a price-fi.."\:ing stat-
ut1'. Tl1t' retail<>r subject to the act is Yictimized for his 
forl'si~ht i11 making early, acl,-antageous purchases of his 
n1Pr("brndisl', b:-- ht·ing required to sell his goods at a 
pric-1· in excess of G'. ~ of the price at which his less astute 
1·1·m1ictitor can tlwn purehase the same merchandise. His 
i'ailme to tlo so subjects him to criminal punishment 
!,a'l'•l npou irrelmttal1]p arnl illog·ical presumptions of 
~nilt. The amhiguitiC'" ,,·hich permeatt.' the -.;tatute re-
quire him to constantly guess as to what he may or may 
not do in seHing his prices, even when all he is attempt-
ing to do is to meet the prices of his competitors. 
Yet, penalized as he is by this legislation, the re-
tailer is not the principal victim. The one who actually 
pays the price for this price-fixing sfatute is the con-
sumer. It is he who pays the higher prices for merchan-
dise because of the act's stifling of competition in the 
retail market. 
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